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Abstract 
In real-world applications, the effective integration 
of learning and reasoning in a cognitive agent 
model is a difficult task. However, such integration 
may lead to a better understanding, use and con-
struction of more realistic models. Unfortunately, 
existing models are either oversimplified or require 
much processing time, which is unsuitable for 
online learning and reasoning. Currently, con-
trolled environments like training simulators do not 
effectively integrate learning and reasoning. In par-
ticular, higher-order concepts and cognitive abili-
ties have many unknown temporal relations with 
the data, making it impossible to represent such re-
lationships by hand. We introduce a novel cogni-
tive agent model and architecture for online learn-
ing and reasoning that seeks to effectively repre-
sent, learn and reason in complex training envi-
ronments. The agent architecture of the model 
combines neural learning with symbolic knowledge 
representation. It is capable of learning new hy-
potheses from observed data, and infers new be-
liefs based on these hypotheses. Furthermore, it 
deals with uncertainty and errors in the data using a 
stochastic inference model in the spirit of Bayesian 
inference. The validation of the model on real-time 
simulations and the results presented here indicate 
the promise of the approach when performing 
online learning and reasoning in real-world scenar-
ios, with possible applications in a range of areas. 
Introduction 
The effective integration of automated learning and cogni-
tive reasoning in real-world applications is a difficult task 
[Valiant, 2003]. Usually, most applications deal with large 
amounts of data observed in the real-world containing er-
rors, missing values and inconsistencies. Even in controlled 
environments, like training simulators, integrated learning 
and reasoning is not very successful [Sandercock, 2004; 
Heuvelink, 2009].  Although the use of training simulators 
simplifies the data and knowledge acquisition, it is still very 
difficult to construct a cognitive model of an (intelligent) 
agent that is able to deal with the many complex relations in 
the observed data. When it comes to the assessment and 
training of high-order cognitive abilities (e.g. leadership, 
tactical manoeuvring, safe driving, etc) training is still 
guided or done by human experts [Bosch and Riemersma, 
2004]. The reason is that expert behaviour on high-level 
cognition is too complex to model, elicit and represent in an 
automated system. There can be many temporal relations 
between low and high-order aspects of a training task. Hu-
man behaviour is often non-deterministic and subjective (i.e. 
biased by personal experience and other factors like stress or 
fatigue) and what is known is often described vaguely and 
limited to explicit (i.e. “explainable”) behaviour.  
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Several attempts have been made to tackle these problems. 
For instance [Fernlund et al., 2006] describes a number of 
systems that use machine learning to learn the complex rela-
tions from observation of experts and trainees during task 
execution. Although these systems are successful in learning 
and generalization, they lack the expressive power of logic-
based (symbolic) systems and are therefore difficult to un-
derstand and validate [Smith and Kosslyn, 2006]. Alterna-
tively, one could add probabilistic reasoning to logic-based 
systems [Heuvelink, 2009]. These systems perform better in 
expressing their internal knowledge as they are logic based 
and are able to deal with inconsistencies in the data because 
they reason with probabilities. Unfortunately, when it comes 
to knowledge representation and modelling these systems 
still require either statistical analysis of large amounts of 
data or knowledge representation by hand. Therefore, both 
approaches are time expensive and are not appropriate for 
use in real-time applications, which demand online learning 
and reasoning. 
In this paper, we present a new cognitive agent model that is 
able to: (i) perform learning of complex temporal relations 
from uncertain observations, (ii) reason probabilistically 
about the knowledge that has been learned, and (iii) repre-
sent the agent's knowledge in a logic-based format for vali-
dation purposes. This is achieved by taking advantage of 
neural learning to perform robust learning and adaptation, 
and symbolic knowledge to represent qualitative reasoning. 
In addition, the model is validated in a training simulator 
employed in real-world scenarios, illustrating the effective 
use of the approach. The results show the agent model is 
able to learn to do automated driver assessment from obser-
vation of real-time simulation data and assessments by driv-
ing instructors and that this knowledge can be extracted in 
the form of temporal logic rules. 
Preliminaries 
The construction of effective cognitive agent models is a 
long standing research endeavour in artificial intelligence, 
cognitive science, and multi-agent systems [Valiant, 2003; 
Wooldridge, 2009]. One of the main challenges toward 
achieving such models is the provision of integrated cogni-
tive abilities, such as learning, reasoning and knowledge 
representation. Recently, cognitive computational models 
based on artificial neural networks have integrated inductive 
learning and deductive reasoning, see e.g. [d'Avila Garcez et 
al., 2009; Lehmann et al., 2010]. In such models, neural 
networks are used to learn and reason about (agent's) 
knowledge about the world, represented by symbolic logic. 
In order to do so, algorithms map logical theories (or 
knowledge about the world) T into a neural network N 
which computes the logical consequences of T. This pro-
vides also a learning system in the network that can be 
trained by examples using T as background knowledge. In 
agents endowed with neural computation, induction is typi-
cally seen as the process of changing the weights of a net-
work in ways that reflect the statistical properties of a data-
set, allowing for generalizations over unseen examples. In 
the same setting, deduction is the neural computation of 
output values as a response to input values (stimuli from the 
environment) given a particular set of weights. Such net-
work computations have been shown equivalent to a range 
of logical formalisms [Lamb et al., 2007]. Based on this 
approach the agent architecture of our model can be seen as 
a Neural Symbolic Cognitive Agent (NSCA). In our model, 
the agent architecture uses temporal logic as theory T and a 
Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM) as neural network N 
[Smolensky, 1986]. A RBM is a partially connected neural 
network with two layers, a visible V and a hidden layer H, 
and symmetric connections W between these layers.  
A RBM defines a probability distribution P(V=v,H=h) over 
pairs of vectors v and h encoded in these layers, where v 
encodes the input data in binary or real values and h encodes 
the posterior probability P(H|v). Such a network can be used 
to infer or reconstruct complete data vectors based on in-
complete or inconsistent input data and therefore implement 
an auto-associative memory. It does so by combining the 
posterior probability distributions generated by each unit in 
the hidden layer with a conditional probability distribution 
for each unit in the visible layer. Each hidden unit constrains 
a different subset of the dimensions in the high-dimensional 
data presented at the visible layer and is therefore called an 
expert on some feature in the input data. Together, the hid-
den units form a so-called “Products of Experts” model that 
constrains all the dimensions in the input data.  
A RBM has no connections between visible and other visi-
ble or hidden and other hidden units, making the experts 
conditionally independent. This restriction makes it possible 
to infer the posterior probabilities for each expert in parallel 
and train the network very effectively using Contrastive 
Divergence [Hinton, 2002]. This makes the learning and 
inference of a RBM very fast and therefore suitable candi-
date for N in our agent architecture. 
The Cognitive Model and Agent Architecture 
Figure 1 presents the Neural-Symbolic Cognitive Agent 
(NSCA) architecture of our cognitive model. This model is 
able to encode domain knowledge in the form of temporal 
logic based inference rules in a RBM, learn new rules from 
observed data, reason with these rules and extract new rules 
in temporal logic form to update the domain knowledge.  
Therefore the NSCA uses a Recurrent Temporal Restricted 
Boltzmann Machine (RTRBM) to encode the temporal rules 
in the form of hypotheses about beliefs and previous applied 
rules. This is possible due to recurrent connections between 
hidden unit activations at time t and the activations at time 
at t-1, see [Sutskever et al., 2008]. Based on the Bayesian 
inference mechanism of the RTRBM each hidden unit Hj 
represents a hypothesis about a specific rule Rj that calcu-
lates the posterior probability that the rule implies a certain 
relation in the beliefs b being observed in the visible layer 
V, given the previous applied rules rt-1 (i.e. P(R|B=b,Rt-1=r
t-
1)). From these hypotheses the RBM selects the most appli-
cable rules r using random Gaussian sampling of the poste-
rior probability distribution (i.e. r ~ P(R|B=b,Rt-1=r
t-1)) and 
calculates the conditional probability or likelihood of all 
beliefs given the selected rules are applied (i.e. P(B|R=r)). 
The difference between the observed and inferred beliefs 
can be used by the NSCA to train the RTRBM (i.e. update 
its weights) in order to improve the encoded knowledge on 
the observed data. There the RTRBM uses a combination of 
Contrastive Divergence and backpropagation through time.  
In the spirit of BDI agents [Bratman, 1999], the observed 
data (e.g. simulation data, human assessments) is encoded as 
beliefs and the difference between the observed and inferred 
beliefs are the actual implications or intentions of the agent 
on its environment (e.g. adapting the assessment scores in 
the training simulator). The value of a belief represents ei-
ther the probability of the occurrence of some event or state 
in the environment (e.g. Raining=true), or a real value (e.g. 
AirplaneX=45000). In other words, the NSCA deals with 
both binary and continuous data, by using a continuous sto-
chastic visible layer [Chen and Murray, 2003]. As will be-
come clear in our experiments, this improves the agent’s 
ability to model asymmetric data, which in turn is very use-
ful since measured data coming from a simulator is often 
asymmetric (e.g. training tasks typically take place in a re-
stricted region of the simulated world).  
Due to the stochastic nature of the sigmoid activation func-
tions used in our model, the beliefs can be regarded as fuzzy 
sets with a Gaussian membership function. This allows us to 
represent vague concepts like fast and slow, as well as ap-
proximations of learned values, which is useful when rea-
soning with implicit and subjective knowledge [Sun, 1994].
 
Figure 1. Global architecture of the Neural-Symbolic Cognitive Agent Model with Recurrent Temporal RBM. 
 
Temporal Knowledge Representation 
To represent domain knowledge in terms of beliefs and 
previously applied rules we use the cognitive temporal 
logic described in [Lamb et al., 2007]. This logic contains 
several modal operators that extend classical modal logic 
with a notion of past and future. To express beliefs on 
continuous variables we extend this logic with the use of 
equality and inequality formulas (e.g. AirplainX<30,000, 
Raining=true). As an example let us take the task de-
picted in Figure 2. In this task, a trainee drives on an ur-
ban road and approaches an intersection. In this scenario 
the trainee has to apply the yield-to-the-right-rule. Using 
our extended temporal logic, we can describe rules about 
the conditions, scenario and assessment related to this 
task. In rules 1 to 4 below, ◊A denotes “A is true some-
time in the future” and ฀Α denotes “A is always true in 
the future”. 
Trainee  
Figure 2. Example training task for driving simulation. 
 
Conditions:
(Weather ≥ good) (1) 
meaning: the weather is at least good  
Scenario: 
ApproachingIntersection ∧ ◊(ApproachingTraffic = right) (2) 
meaning: the car is approaching an intersection and sometime in the 
future traffic is approaching from the right 
 
((Speed > 0) ∧ HeadingIntersection) S (DistanceIntersec-
tion < x) → ApproachingIntersection 
(3) 
meaning: if the car is moving and heading towards an intersection 
since it has been deemed close to the intersection, then the car is 
approaching the intersection. 
 
Assessment: 
ApproachingIntersection ∧ (DistanceIntersection = 0) ∧ 
(ApproachingTraffic = right) ∧ (Speed = 0) →                      
(Evaluation = good) 
(4) 
meaning: If the car is approaching an intersection and arrives at the 
intersection when traffic is coming from the right and stops then the 
trainee gets a good evaluation. 
 
Rule 4 is an example of an uncertain notion that is highly 
subjective (the distance at which a person is regarded as 
approaching an intersection is dependent on the situation 
and personal experience). When this rule is encoded in a 
RTRBM, it becomes possible to learn a more objective 
value for x based on the observed behaviour of different 
people in various scenarios. This exemplifies our main 
objective at combining reasoning and learning in this pa-
per. 
In our model, the temporal logic rules are represented by 
setting the weights W and W’ (see Figure 1) in the 
RTRBM. Therefore the rules need to be translated to a 
form that relates only to the immediately previous time 
step (denoted by the temporal operator ●). A transforma-
tion algorithm for this is described in [Lamb et al., 2007]. 
Then we can encode any rule as a stochastic relation be-
tween the hidden unit that represents the rule, the visible 
units that represent the beliefs and the previous hidden 
unit activations that represent the applied rules in the pre-
vious time step. For example, the rule αSβ denotes that a 
belief α has been true since the occurrence of belief β. 
This can be translated to the following rules: β → αSβ and 
α ∧ ●(αSβ) → αSβ, where α and β are modelled by visible 
units, αSβ by a hidden unit and ●(αSβ) is modelled by a 
recurrent connection to the same hidden unit. [Pinkas, 
1995] shows how to map these logic-based propositions 
to the energy function of a symmetric network and how to 
deal with uncertainty by introducing a notion of certainty 
or confidence, called “penalty”. We have adapted those 
algorithms to temporal logic and the RTRBM and show 
how to encode temporal logic rules in RTRBM and how 
to extract revised rules from a trained RTRBM. 
Rule Extraction Algorithm  
Step 1: Finding maximum likelihood. In order to extract 
the temporal rules from the RTRBM, we need to find the 
states of the visible units (V) and hidden units (H) that 
lower the total energy in its energy function. This means 
finding the states that maximize the likelihood for each 
rule. These states form the local minima (stable states) in 
the energy function and depend on the weights encoded in 
the RTRBM. Using the RTRBM’s inference mechanism 
we can find these states by sampling the belief states from 
the conditional probability distribution calculated for each 
rule, given only that rule is selected (i.e., H(j)=1 
H(x≠j)=0). More formally, for each hidden unit H(j) we cre-
ate a rule Rj
 and for each visible unit V(i) a belief Bi for 
which the conditional probabilities of the beliefs and pre-
vious applied rules Rt-1j (associated with the hidden unit 
activations at time t-1 denoted by Ht-1
(j))  are defined by: 
 
P(Bi|Rj) = P(V
(i)|H(j)=1, H(x≠j)=0) (6) 
P(Rt-1j|Rj) = P(Ht-1
(j)|H(j)=1, H(x≠j)=0) (7) 
For each rule Rj, the value of each belief in the belief 
base, denoted as a vector bj is set to P(B|Rj) (denoted by  ← in Eq. 8) and the value of each previously applied 
rules, denoted as rt-1j is sampled (using a random Gaussian 
sampling) from P(Rt-1|Rj) (this is denoted by ~ in Eq. 9).  
 
bj ← P(B|Rj) (8) 
rt-1j ~ P(R
t-1|Rj) (9) 
Step 2. Generating a rule. When we have calculated the 
belief and previous rule states that maximize the likeli-
hood of each rule, we can construct a temporal logic for-
mula Ψ with temporal modalities using the following 
equations (where k is the number of beliefs, m the number 
of rules and wij is the weight of the connection between 
V(i) and H(j)): 
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The propositions on beliefs, denoted by φj(i), are calcu-
lated using Eq. 11 and depend on the weight wij of the 
connection between the hidden unit H(j) that represents 
rule Rj and visible unit V
(i) that represents belief Bi. A 
negative weight between V(i) and H(j) will increase the 
probability of Rj when we decrease the value of Bi. So all 
values for belief Bi less or equal to bj(i) will increase the 
probability of rule Rj. The inverse applies to a positive 
weight. When the weight is zero a belief has no influence 
on the rule and can be left out.  
The propositions on previous applied rules, denoted by 
ρj(i), are calculated using Eq. 12 and are represented with 
the temporal operator ●. By applying the transformation 
algorithm in [Lamb et al., 2007] the generated rules can 
be further simplified for readability. 
In the spirit of [Pinkas, 1995] and [Lee, 1997] we also 
calculate a confidence level cj for each rule that denotes 
the probability that rule Rj is actually implied by the state 
defined in bj and r
t-1
j (see Eq. 13). 
Rule Encoding Algorithm 
The knowledge extraction algorithm above shows that 
temporal logic rules can be extracted from RTRBM rea-
sonably efficient. Encoding these rules is straightforward 
and the dual of the extraction algorithm. 
Step 1. Encoding a rule. For each rule defined by Eq. 10: 
1. Add a hidden unit H(j) to the RTRBM to represent Rj. 
2. For each belief Bi in the rule, add a visible unit V
(i).  
3. Randomize the weights connecting V(i) with H(j). 
Step 2. Updating the RTRBM. For each rule calculate 
the weights that maximize the likelihood of the beliefs Bj 
and previously applied rules Rt-1j: 
1. For each hidden unit H(j), calculate its activation h(j) 
using the inference algorithm in [Sutskever et al., 
2008]. 
2. Set the value of hidden unit H(j) to 1 and the other 
hidden units H(x≠j) to 0. 
3. Infer the conditional probabilities of beliefs b’ and 
previous applied rules r’ given the current weights 
using eqs. 8 and 9. 
4. Minimize the difference by minimizing the contras-
tive divergence between resp. h(j), b’ and r’ and the 
values for cj, Bj and R
t-1
j as defined by rule Rj. 
Experiments and Results 
The cognitive model has been developed as part of a three 
year research project on assessment in driving simulators, 
carried out by TNO in cooperation with the Dutch licens-
ing authority (CBR), Research Centre for Examination 
and Certification (RCEC), Rozendom Technologies, and 
ANWB driving schools. The NSCA is implemented using 
a multi-agent platform for Virtual Instruction [Penning et 
al., 2008] and used for an experiment on one of the 
ANWB driving simulators. In this experiment 5 students 
participated in a driving test consisting of 5 test scenarios 
each. For each attempt all data (e.g. relative positions and 
orientations of all traffic, and speed, gear, rpm, signalling 
and steering wheel angle of the student car) from the 
simulator was recorded (i.e. in total 43 measurements for 
each time-step of 30ms). Afterwards the attempts were 
assessed by 3 driving instructors on 5 driving skills (i.e. 
vehicle control, economic driving, traffic flow, social-, 
and safe driving) and the assessment scores (i.e. 0-100) 
and recorded data were provided to the NSCA.  
The following figures (3 and 4) show that the NSCA is 
able to learn from real-time observations and instructor 
assessments and do automated assessment. For readabil-
ity, the figures only show the actual (i.e. given by the in-
structor) and inferred beliefs (i.e. calculated by the 
NSCA) on assessment scores, but in fact the NSCA re-
constructs beliefs over all aspects, including the expected 
position and orientation of other vehicles. This generative 
property of the RBM enables the NSCA to deal with un-
certainty and missing data related to the observed beliefs 
based on the encoded rules. Also, the difference between 
actual and inferred beliefs can be used to change a simula-
tion in order to adapt to the student’s level of expertise 
(i.e. adaptive training) by translating it to actions in the 
simulator. 
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Figure 3. Actual and inferred assessment scores (i.e. vehicle 
control, economic driving, traffic flow, social driving and safe 
driving) when the student is doing nothing. 
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Figure 4. Actual and inferred assessment scores when instructor 
is assessing vehicle control and economic driving skills. 
Eqs. 14 and 15 show some examples of temporal rules 
learned by and extracted from the NSCA. These rules 
imply relations on beliefs and previously applied rules 
with a certain probability. In case of driving assessment, 
the implications are the assessment scores that are in-
ferred from observed behaviour in a driving simulator. 
For readability we left out the beliefs that have insignifi-
cant impact on the truth-value of the rules based on the 
normalized weights of the beliefs in the rules. Further-
more each rule includes the confidence level of the im-
plied relation. 
 
0.72: R47 ↔ car_Spatial_Orientation_Psi >= 0.062 ∧ 
car_Spatial_WorldLocation_Y >= -2701220  ∧ 
car_Spatial_WorldLocation_Z >= 1632605 ∧ cy-
clist_Spatial_Orientation_Psi <= -0.088 ∧ cy-
clist_Spatial_WorldLocation_X <= -163262 ∧ cy-
clist_Spatial_WorldLocation_Z <= 1598489 ∧ my-
car_BrakeDepression <= 49.5 ∧ mycar_EmergencyLight = 
false ∧ mycar_Gear >= 2 ∧ mycar_HighBeam = false ∧ my-
car_ParkingBrake = false ∧ mycar_RightIndicator = false ∧ 
objectives_flow_score >= 50.56101934052543 ∧ ●R3 ∧ ●R4 ∧ 
●R6 ∧ ●R8 ∧ ●R9 ∧ ●R11 ∧ ●R13 ∧ ●R16  ∧ ●R23 ∧ ●R24 ∧ ●R25 ∧ ●R28 ∧ ●R42
(14) 
0.78: R13 ↔ car_Spatial_Orientation_Phi <= -0.031 ∧ 
car_Spatial_WorldLocation_Y >= -2702291 ∧ cy-
clist_Spatial_Orientation_Phi >= 0.085 ∧ cy-
clist_Spatial_WorldLocation_X <= -164763 ∧ my-
car_BrakeDepression <= 49.2 ∧ mycar_EmergencyLight = 
false ∧ mycar_FuelConsumption >= 0.0045 ∧ mycar_Gear >= 
1 ∧ mycar_HighBeam = false ∧ mycar_SteeringAngleVelocity 
>= -57.5 ∧ objectives_flow_score <= 49.78478771808131 ∧ 
objectives_safe_score <= 49.55145948925322 ∧ ●R1 ∧ ●R4 ∧ 
●R6 ∧ ●R7 ∧ ●R8 ∧ ●R10 ∧ ●R11 ∧ ●R12 ∧ ●R17 ∧ ●R21 ∧ ●R25 ∧ ●R28 ∧ ●R34 ∧ ●R44
(15) 
 
The rules in eq. 14 and 15 are the result of a small ex-
periment and require further validation by experts, but one 
can see plausible effects that certain beliefs have on the 
outcome of the assessment scores. For example, when the 
gear in rule R47 is in position 2 or higher we can conjec-
ture that this facilitates better traffic flow. And when the 
steering angle velocity in rule R13 is very high (i.e. the 
student’s steering must have been very rough), one can 
imagine lower assessment scores on safe driving. More 
experiments with larger populations of student and in-
structors have been planned for this year for which we 
expect further improvement of the learned knowledge on 
driving assessment. 
Conclusions and Future Work 
The cognitive model and agent architecture presented in 
this paper offer an effective approach that integrates sym-
bolic reasoning and neural learning in a unified model. 
This approach allows the modelled agent to learn rules 
about observed data in complex, real-world environments 
(e.g. expert behaviour for training and assessment in 
simulators). Learned behaviour can be extracted to update 
existing domain knowledge for validation, reporting and 
feedback. Furthermore the approach allows domain 
knowledge to be encoded in the model and deals with 
uncertainty in real-world data. Results described in the 
paper show that the agent is able to learn rules from ob-
servations and extract it into a temporal logic formula. 
Although initial results are promising, the model requires 
further validation by driving experts. More experiments 
are planned on ANWB driving simulators. This will allow 
further validation of the model in an operational setting 
with many scenarios, a large trainee population and mul-
tiple assessments by driving instructors. In parallel, the 
system will also be tested in other simulation domains, 
like jetfighter pilot training and for strategic command 
and control training. Other future work includes research 
on using Deep Boltzmann Machines [Salakhutdinov and 
Hinton, 2009] to find higher-level rules and the applica-
tion of an RTRBM to facilitate adaptive training. In sum-
mary, we believe that our work provides an integrated 
model for knowledge representation, learning and reason-
ing which may indeed lead to realistic computational cog-
nitive agent models, thus answering the challenges put 
forward in [Valiant, 2003; Wooldridge, 2009]. 
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